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Abstract
I design a basic model based on the role of the tax administration as a lender of last resort (Andreoni 1992). If the
administration's sole concern is for tax revenues, then it is optimal for it to make taxpayers take an unfair gamble.
However, if it also gives some weight to the taxpayers' welfare in its objective function and this is sufficiently large,
the situation might be reversed so that the auditing probability is lower and the evasion rate is higher. Under decreasing
absolute risk aversion preferences, optimal enforcement is counter-cyclical (that is, greater liquidity constraints imply a
higher level of enforcement) unless the administration attaches a considerable amount of weight to taxpayers' utility,
which – at least in “normal times” – seems implausible. These theoretical results are complemented with numerical
simulations.
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1. Introduction 
 
Does tax evasion vary along the economic cycle? This might be the case if taxpayers 
are liquidity constrained (Andreoni 1992). Under this scenario, the tax administration acting as 
a lender of last resort might be the only chance for taxpayers to smooth consumption along 
time, such that they are even willing to play an unfair gamble. We characterize optimal 
enforcement within this scenario.  
 
This characterization depends on the objective function of the administration. If it only cares 
for the amount of revenue collected, it will play an unfair gamble with taxpayers, who will still 
evade. This situation holds unless the relative value attached to the marginal utility of taxpayers 
is enormous with respect to the value of revenue for the administration. Under DARA 
preferences and liquidity constrained taxpayers, enforcement is counter-cyclical1; again, this 
could reverse under the unlikely situation previously referred. Hence, to some extent the 
administration plays a stabilization role under the threat of future severe inspections.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I characterize the behaviour of 
taxpayers under liquidity constraints; in Section 3, I obtain the optimal level of enforcement; 
in Section 4, numerical simulations are provided to exemplify those theoretical results; and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Taxpayer’s Behaviour: Andreoni 1992 
 
I follow Andreoni’s 1992 model. Homogeneous individuals live two periods, t = 1, 2. 
In t=1, they earn taxable income, �!; the corresponding tax return might be audited in the 
future. In t=2, they get an untaxed bequest, �"2, which is known with certainty by individuals 
in t=1. Thus, the financial benefits from evasion accrue in t=1, while the costs of evasion – if 
audited – accrue in t=2. Apart from the traditional incentive to evade based on a fair gamble 
(i.e., the expected financial return from evasion is positive), this delay might create a peculiar 
financial incentive. This is due to a capital market imperfection because potential lenders do 
not know in advance about the existence of �" (as taxpayers do), and so in absence of other 
collaterals, evasion is the only alternative I consider liquidity constrained individuals have to 
smooth consumption along time.  
 
X1 is the amount of undeclared income in t=1 such that �! = �! −�!#, where �!# is the 
reported amount of taxable income. Hence, consumption in t=1 is �! = �! −�!#� = �' +
��!, where � is the personal income tax rate, and �' = �!(1 − �) is net income under full 
compliance. Thus, evasion generates a virtual income equal to ��!. With a random probability, 
�, the evader might be audited in t=2, and then consumption is �"$ = �" − (� + �)�!, where 
� is the fine per unit of evaded taxes (Yitzhaki 1974), � ≡ � × �, F>1, and assume the interest 
rate is zero; otherwise, in absence of an audit, and with random probability (1 − �), �"%$ =
�". 
 
1 Durán-Cabré et al. 2020 have empirically shown this is the case for Spain. 
 
2 To simplify we assume this bequest is untaxed (or if taxed, there is no possibility of evasion). This is 
justified on the grounds that I just want to focus on the incentives to evade taxes (today) under the 
presence of liquidity constraints (today). I am not interested in dynamic models of evasion (Engel and 
Hines 1999; Niepelt 2005). 
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Intertemporal additively separable utility, U, is �(�!) + (1 − �)�(�"%$) + ��(�"$), where 
u´´<0<u´3. Therefore, ideally, the taxpayer would like to smooth consumption along time. I 
focus on financially constrained individuals, that is, �" > �' . Andreoni 1992 showed that if 
�" is above a given threshold, that is, if taxpayers are severely financially constrained, they 
might evade even if � < 0, where � ≡ � − �(� + �) is the expected profitability of cheating. 
To understand this, note that for �! = 0, a positive optimal level of evasion holds if the FOC 
of the taxpayer’s intertemporal maximization problem with respect to �! is positive, that is, 
 
�&(�' )� − ��&(�")(� + �)|'!() > 0																																																																																							[1] 
 
I define the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption, m, as 
�	º	 �′(�!) �&(�"$)⁄ , where � > 1 under liquidity constraints. Then, rearranging [1], we have: 
 
� > �(1 − �)	                                                                                                                [2] 
 
Evading taxes (�! > 0) is optimal if [2] holds. For a given tax rate, the right-hand side of [2], 
which is negative, will be larger in absolute levels, the larger the marginal rate of substitution, 
�. Hence, even for � < 0, those severely constrained (large �) will find evasion to be welfare-
enhancing; that is, the benefit of smoothing consumption overcomes the cost of an unfair 
gamble (� < 0). This is the peculiar incentive of evasion under financial constraints. From total 





< 0 and *'!
*,"
> 04. Up to now, this is 
standard. 
 
3. Optimal Tax Enforcement: Basic Characterization 
 
Given the optimal taxpayer’s behaviour, now I characterize the optimal enforcement 
policy, picked by the auditing probability. I consider a general objective function (see, e.g., 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1987): 
 
{�!#� − �!�} + �{�(�!) + ��(�"$) + (1 − �)�(�"%$) − �}	                                      [3] 
 
The aim of the administration is maximizing revenue collected5, subject to achieving a 
minimum level of taxpayers’ welfare, R; V(.) is the taxpayer’s indirect utility function. Hence, 
if l=0, we are under the most common positive characterization of a tax administration; if l>0, 
the level of enforcement is chosen also taking into account taxpayers’ welfare. Analytically, l 
is the ratio between the marginal value of revenue collected due to increasing p and the social 
marginal utility for taxpayers of decreasing p. That is, due to a variation in p, the administration 
is indifferent between l more € for taxpayers and one more € of tax revenue collected. 
Conceptually, thus, l is the social taxpayer’s utility loss of increasing p.  
 
The control variable of the above maximization problem is p, and the FOC is: 
 
3 Partial derivates of functions of a single variable are indicated by a prime (as many primes, as the 
degree of the corresponding partial derivative). 
 
4 The full derivation of these total derivatives is available upon request from the author. 
 
5 We abstract from marginal costs of administration.  
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F	º	 C(� + �) − � -'!
-+
D + �{�(�"$) − �(�"%$)} = 0                                                                         [4] 
 




< 0                                                                                                                                  [5] 
 
Thus, under financial constraints, it is optimal for the administration to play an unfair gamble 
with taxpayers, and they will accept it if they are severely liquidity constrained (see eq. [2]). If 







                                              [6]         
 
In particular, given �(�"%$) − �(�"$) > 0, for a large value of l, it might be optimal for the 
administration to play a fair gamble with taxpayers, despite they are liquidity constrained. I 
will show this by means of numerical simulations. 
 
Before that, I perform a basic comparative static analysis to see how enforcement reacts when 













J < 0 if 
�′′′(�!)>0. The sign of this third derivative holds under Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion 
(DARA) preferences, which I assume from now on; it implies the degree of absolute prudence 
of the taxpayer,−�&&&(�<) �&&⁄ (�<), is positive and so absolute risk aversion is decreasing with 
wealth (see, e.g., Eeckhoudt et al. 2005, Section 1.5). All in all, if � < 0, *+
*,!
< 0; so, if the 
taxpayer becomes less financially constrained, enforcement will go down, that is, it is counter-
cyclical. Results reverse if � > 0. I check this in Section 4. 
 
4. Numerical Simulations 
 
 In accordance with DARA preferences, individual utility is logarithmic. Apart from 
this, throughout we assume W2=20, t=.5, and F=1.56. First of all, we characterize the taxpayer’s 
behaviour. In Graph 1, we see that if the taxpayer is not liquidity constrained (W1=20), tax 
evasion is null if µ<0, which is the case for p>.4, and as expected the lower the audit 
probability, the higher the evasion rate. Ceteris paribus, evasion is larger, the higher the level 
of liquidity constraint. For W1=5 (“75% constrained”), evasion is 100% even for µ<0, and it 
only starts decreasing for p>.72. Hence, evasion soars in times of crisis. In Graph 2, we show 







6 The aim of the numerical simulations is to compare across different performances of the administration 









Regarding the administration, as expected enforcement decreases, the evasion rate increases, 
and the liquidity constraint is milder (check, e.g., the ratio between private consumption across 
periods) for larger values of l (Table 1). Here, the taxpayer is only “25% liquidity constrained” 
(15/20); that is why, even for l=40, µ<0. In the set of tables 2, though, we show that for large 
l and severely financially constrained individuals, µ>0 (first two columns of Table 2.3). 
Finally, in Graph 3, we show that tax enforcement is counter-cyclical unless the value of l is 
extremely large. In the absence of liquidity constraints, the optimal enforcement rate converges 
to .4, which is the situation for which µ=0. In fact, accordingly to what we saw in Section 3 



































































































































Graph 2. Tax Evasion Evolution along 
liquidity constraints rates for different levels 
of enforcement 
Graph 1. Tax Evasion Response to  
Enforcement for different levels of liquidity 
constraints 
Graph 3. Optimal enforcement rate 
depending on the liquidity constraint rate and 
for different l 
Graph 4. Optimal expected value of cheating 
depending on the liquidity constraint rate and 




































































































Table 1. Optimal Tax Enforcement for different weights of taxpayer’s utility (W1=15) 
 l=0 (Leviathan) l=8 l=20 l=40 (Fully Benevolent) 
Audit probability (p) .4652 .4583 .4449 .4056 
Expected value of 
cheating (µ) 
-.0814 -.0723 -.0561 -.0070 
Evasion rate  9.31% 10.29% 12.24% 18.17% 
Taxpayer’s utility (U) 2.4784 2.4787 2.4794 2.4820 
Expected tax revenue  7.6137 7.6125 7.6030 7.5191 
Private consumption 
(year 1) 
15.70 15.77 15.92 16.36 
Private consumption 
if audited (year 2) 
18.25 18.07 17.70 16.59 
Social Welfare 7.6137 27.4422 57.1904 106.7987 
 
 
Table 2.1. Optimal Tax Enforcement for different liquidity constraint rates (l=0) 
 75% constrained 50%  25%  0% 
Audit probability (p) .9079 .5875 .4652 .3999 
Expected value of 
cheating (µ) 
-.6349 -.2343 -.0814 0 
Evasion rate  72.55% 26.78% 9.31% 0% 
Taxpayer’s utility (U) 2.0330 2.3089 2.4784 2.6021 
Expected tax revenue  4.8030 5.6275 7.6137 10 
Private consumption 
(year 1) 
6.81 11.34 15.70 20 
Private consumption 
if audited (year 2) 
15.47 16.65 18.25 20 









Table 2.2. Optimal Tax Enforcement for different liquidity constraint rates (l=8) 
 75% constrained 50%  25%  0% 
Audit probability (p) .8321 .5650 .4583 .3999 
Expected value of 
cheating (µ) 
-.5401 -.2063 -.0729 0 
Evasion rate  83.83% 30.03% 10.29% 0% 
Taxpayer’s utility (U) 2.0422 2.3108 2.4787 2.6021 
Expected tax revenue  4.7639 5.6194 7.6125 10 
Private consumption 
(year 1) 
7.10 11.50 15.77 20 
Private consumption 
if audited (year 2) 
14.76 16.25 18.07 20 




Table 2.3. Optimal Tax Enforcement for different liquidity constraint rates (l=40) 
 75% constrained 50%  25%  0% 
Audit probability (p) 0 .36405 .4056 .3999 
Expected value of 
cheating (µ) 
.4999 .0449 -.0070 0 
Evasion rate  100% 63.92% 18.18% 0% 
Taxpayer’s utility (U) 2.1761 2.3408 2.4820 2.6021 
Expected tax revenue  0 4.7128 7.5190 10 
Private consumption 
(year 1) 
7.5 13.20 16.36 20 
Private consumption 
if audited (year 2) 
13.75 12.01 16.59 20 









Tax evasion and enforcement have traditionally been analysed within a static 
framework. However, the consideration of important shocks – for example, COVID-197 – may 
change some basic results. While there is a growing empirical literature on this, theoretical 
analyses are scarce. Here, I have shown that, unless fiscal and financial measures are enacted, 
taxpayers use evasion as a smoothing mechanism to mitigate the impact of liquidity constraints, 
under which the administration performs a counter-cyclical role, at least in “normal times” (see 
fn. (7)). That is, current evasion is certainly an unfair gamble for constrained individuals; and 
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